The concept of Time may be regarded as drawing itself originally from two general domains: (1) the internal mental domain of analytic and synthetic cognitions and hence time-perceptions, and (2) the external, empirical domain of the calendar with its roots in the ritualized, commemorated, and studied motions of stars, planets, and other heavenly bodies, and which thus constitutes the earliest formal grounding for human horological practices. The difference between the concept and its phenomenal ground, consists entirely in this. This division might then be regarded as Pure (or Conceptual) Horology and Practical Horology.
Both the pure and the practical facets of horology indicate an existentialle within dasein: his contention with Time. And this shows up in a certain way, as will be shown through a consideration for dasein's social practices, given here as particular moments seen in a conversation. In general when, for the sake of conversation, dasein comes face-to-face with another person (or more simply put, an other) we may note specific distinctive incidences of transcendence. As Levinas works out at length, this face-to-face encounter is the locus of an event of transcendence, the disclosure of a trace pointing toward alterity, or the difference an other makes.
Conversation arises in a normal, everyday context of the various incidences and events provided by schedules, whether these are work calendars, or of planned vacations. They are also part of this calendrical practice, even if their content is merely a "time-filling" or "event-ordering" device, such as an "ice-breaker" or a gentleman's excuse. The contention with time remains alive throughout the conversation, so that in both speaking to and listening to the other, there may arise moments of retreat from external awareness. The other speaks, but no one is listening, because thought interjects and derails the attention, redirecting the mind inward, toward a solipsistic contemplation.
These transcendental movements are herein regarded with respect to the concept of attention and in that light of that general condition called attention span. When speaking of the face as the locus, the where, of the event of transcendence, we speak of the way that the face discloses traces of a solipsistic retreat through the withdrawal of attention from empirical consciousness, a withdrawal that takes its point of departure from the questioning of the meaning of being and draws the mind toward an historical, phenomenological understanding of the concept of time, an understanding that in a sense lay at the end of an understanding of self, and hence as a telos for apperception. The annual calendar is for the most part an indispensable part of our identity. The man is a Catholic by virtue of his participation in the calendrical ritualized event that defines and structures annual Catholic life: Christmas, Easter, Sunday Mass, the Celebrations of the Lives of the Saints. Interspersed may be any number of public, community events, intended to fill the time of the year in festival, or engaged in practical outreach, community service, and so forth.
It is in this situation that our skills as teachers, builders, cooks, drivers, organizers, leaders, employees, parents, and so forth structure our dialectical lives. Conversations fall to these themes and others like them, or with respect to aesthetic concerns, ethical concerns, and questions of ultimate meaning. The practical activity of organizing our lives according to the schedule of a calendar determines this meaningfulness of finite existence just as much as the conceptual life of the for-the-sake-of-which that provides an understanding of that meaning.
In the course of talking in the context of these varied circumstances, there arise non-parities, inequalities. Conversations with certain individuals may expose us to frequent interruptions, or in conversation with others, we may find our minds filled with ideas, and may have to constantly revisit the other's act of speech with renewed attention. The attention which does this undergoes a solipsistic retreat from empirical awareness, the attention span becomes thin and attenuated, or split.
In another case, the form of a talking over, an interruption: the other is disjoined from their own event of disclosure. The other who discloses thought may fall silent in order to listen, the thought may pass incomplete. In interruption, one opens up a disclosure toward the other while closing off disclosure. In the interruption of a condescension, a desire interrupts which valuates one's own time over that of the other. In the interruption, there lay a solipsistic withdraw of the attention from listening to what has been said and what is being said. This is a retreat, or a withdrawal into the first-person perspective. An empirically-minded scientist may be tempted to turn a blind eye to even the possibility of a transcendental content in the mind of the other. The other is reduced in concept from something enigmatic or fathomless to something knowable and known, the thought of the other is designified.
Other than this solipsistic retreat, there is another transcendental movement and which is the flipside of this coin of attention, and this is the return of consciousness to empirical awareness. This movement may become alerted to the fact that the train of attention has become derailed, and may seek to resume through a circumspection of recent moments. The words already passed as the other's speech, are pulled back from the thought of having just heard them. The mind attempts to get itself back up to speed; where did I leave the conversation, and where are we at now? Time travels internally and externally in our thought and in our dialogue, and to follow its every trace is to have our attention divided. Time seems selfish for shares of our attention and in different ways.
These are matters for which we cannot reverse the event, but can only exercise our attention to be more attentive, to derail less, to listen more, and as much for understanding as for response. This concern for understanding the other is thus what overcomes the solipsistic mentality leading the attention to review and resume its empirical awareness. The transcendental motion here derives from the other, from their alterity, from the space of their own speech, their own thought, their own understanding of a matter.
Both the pure and the practical facets of horology indicate an existentialle within dasein: his contention with Time. And this shows up in a certain way, as will be shown through a consideration for dasein's social practices, given here as particular moments seen in a conversation. In general when, for the sake of conversation, dasein comes face-to-face with another person (or more simply put, an other) we may note specific distinctive incidences of transcendence. As Levinas works out at length, this face-to-face encounter is the locus of an event of transcendence, the disclosure of a trace pointing toward alterity, or the difference an other makes.
Conversation arises in a normal, everyday context of the various incidences and events provided by schedules, whether these are work calendars, or of planned vacations. They are also part of this calendrical practice, even if their content is merely a "time-filling" or "event-ordering" device, such as an "ice-breaker" or a gentleman's excuse. The contention with time remains alive throughout the conversation, so that in both speaking to and listening to the other, there may arise moments of retreat from external awareness. The other speaks, but no one is listening, because thought interjects and derails the attention, redirecting the mind inward, toward a solipsistic contemplation.
These transcendental movements are herein regarded with respect to the concept of attention and in that light of that general condition called attention span. When speaking of the face as the locus, the where, of the event of transcendence, we speak of the way that the face discloses traces of a solipsistic retreat through the withdrawal of attention from empirical consciousness, a withdrawal that takes its point of departure from the questioning of the meaning of being and draws the mind toward an historical, phenomenological understanding of the concept of time, an understanding that in a sense lay at the end of an understanding of self, and hence as a telos for apperception. The annual calendar is for the most part an indispensable part of our identity. The man is a Catholic by virtue of his participation in the calendrical ritualized event that defines and structures annual Catholic life: Christmas, Easter, Sunday Mass, the Celebrations of the Lives of the Saints. Interspersed may be any number of public, community events, intended to fill the time of the year in festival, or engaged in practical outreach, community service, and so forth.
It is in this situation that our skills as teachers, builders, cooks, drivers, organizers, leaders, employees, parents, and so forth structure our dialectical lives. Conversations fall to these themes and others like them, or with respect to aesthetic concerns, ethical concerns, and questions of ultimate meaning. The practical activity of organizing our lives according to the schedule of a calendar determines this meaningfulness of finite existence just as much as the conceptual life of the for-the-sake-of-which that provides an understanding of that meaning.
In the course of talking in the context of these varied circumstances, there arise non-parities, inequalities. Conversations with certain individuals may expose us to frequent interruptions, or in conversation with others, we may find our minds filled with ideas, and may have to constantly revisit the other's act of speech with renewed attention. The attention which does this undergoes a solipsistic retreat from empirical awareness, the attention span becomes thin and attenuated, or split.
In another case, the form of a talking over, an interruption: the other is disjoined from their own event of disclosure. The other who discloses thought may fall silent in order to listen, the thought may pass incomplete. In interruption, one opens up a disclosure toward the other while closing off disclosure. In the interruption of a condescension, a desire interrupts which valuates one's own time over that of the other. In the interruption, there lay a solipsistic withdraw of the attention from listening to what has been said and what is being said. This is a retreat, or a withdrawal into the first-person perspective. An empirically-minded scientist may be tempted to turn a blind eye to even the possibility of a transcendental content in the mind of the other. The other is reduced in concept from something enigmatic or fathomless to something knowable and known, the thought of the other is designified.
Other than this solipsistic retreat, there is another transcendental movement and which is the flipside of this coin of attention, and this is the return of consciousness to empirical awareness. This movement may become alerted to the fact that the train of attention has become derailed, and may seek to resume through a circumspection of recent moments. The words already passed as the other's speech, are pulled back from the thought of having just heard them. The mind attempts to get itself back up to speed; where did I leave the conversation, and where are we at now? Time travels internally and externally in our thought and in our dialogue, and to follow its every trace is to have our attention divided. Time seems selfish for shares of our attention and in different ways.
These are matters for which we cannot reverse the event, but can only exercise our attention to be more attentive, to derail less, to listen more, and as much for understanding as for response. This concern for understanding the other is thus what overcomes the solipsistic mentality leading the attention to review and resume its empirical awareness. The transcendental motion here derives from the other, from their alterity, from the space of their own speech, their own thought, their own understanding of a matter.
