One of the most well-known analytical philosophers of the 20th century, Bertrand Russell, once referred to Hegel as "the hardest to understand of the great philosophers," for which reason, many subsequent analytical philosophers (particularly those who have little tolerance for obscurity in philosophy) have come to assume that this implied that Hegel had nothing of importance to say. Yet, we should note that Russell did not simply call him "the hardest to understand", but also called him a "great philosopher", so that the double entendre should not be lost on us, but at least ought to prevent analytic thinkers from dismissing his insights entirely.
The task of analytic logic is thoroughly wedded to the critical practice of assessing the arguments of thinkers, analytical or otherwise. As such, analytic philosophers may express vexation at times in dealing with obscure writing, since this compounds the difficulties of assessing the merits or demerits of a grand philosophical work. What would be ideal (for the analytical critic) is for the author to express his or her whole philosophical system in terms that plied closely to the subject-predicate propositions described by Aristotle, or else, to make ample use of the declarative copula.
Hegel's writing is at least descriptive of the spirit of history, as is largely his intention, but the various foci of his writing include such things as concepts as such, ideas as such, notions as such, spirit as such, rights as such, freedom as such, and so on. These are, taken by themselves, resilient against analytical attempts to define and indicate as phenomena, since they are ultimately noumena, or in the German, dingen-an-sich. Their very natures as conceptual sources produces many of the difficulties of assessing them in terms of their ultimate or ideal meanings, and the ways we define them in our tendencies toward utilizing them for making ontological and moral arguments. That is, they do not easily lend themselves to criticism by way of theoretical assertions regarding what they are or are not, but only by means of a kind of historical test, which leads thinking to regard certain matters as intuitive and correct, regardless of whether history has in every case provided a people with the full manifestation of the thought. To make plainer what I mean, consider that not every natural human right has been secured and protected by every government in history. And yet, we do have a certain rational intuition which would lead us to suppose that a right remains a right regardless of its absence or presence in law. A right is a thing in itself, and not simply something seen or not seen, something whose existence or non-existence stands solely upon its realization within an historical framework.
This was one of Hegel's most important insights, that concepts belong to noumenological thinking, and that they were transcendental sources for moral thinking. But Hegel is not to be credited with inventing this idea (so much less would he have been able to argue it if he were!). Indeed, he received the idea at least in part from Immanuel Kant, who made clear how the the spirit of change resides in the spirit of self as Time. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that time is the internal, synthetical form of sensuous intuitions, This can be further clarified by noting what he regarded as the external form of sensuous intuition, Space. As such, Kant framed the mind-body dichotomy in a way that clarified Descartes' basic maxim, cogito; ergo, sum: I think; therefore, I am. This Internal form, of self-as-Time, provides us with much of the substance we find in Hegel's idea of the self as the spirit of change. Karl Marx inherits this same idea in his famous criticism of Feuerbach, wherein he argues that the goal of philosophy is not simply to describe the world, but to change it.
Such a vision, wherein the person can be a force for change, because their internal hermeneutical constitution is itself comprised of the ultimate force for change (Time), echoes an ancient idea that was perhaps first stated in the Bhagavad-Gītā, wherein Kṛṣṇa claims an identity with Time. It is perhaps no mere coincidence then, that Hegel was disposed to quote Kṛṣṇa in his own work on the spirit of history.
Progressivism, as the political identity of this spirit may be indicated always looks to the future as a source of novelty and improvement, even while keeping one eye toward a criticism of all that already exists. Here, one's ability to see the world temporally—as consisting of past, present, and future—also provides one the ability to anticipate what is yet to come (in harmony with the spirit of progress), while keeping at bay all attempts to turn it back through mere nostalgia for what must finally perish, and which may resent its own finitude for fear of death.
Descartes' Cogito gave birth to Modern philosophy, and amplified the insights of German Idealism. Both Kant and Hegel owe much to Descartes for giving them a starting point from which to imagine the world. The spirit of Time gave itself expression through the Transcendental philosophy of Kant, and through the Historiology of Hegel. Understanding the implications of Hegelian philosophy would seem thus to require us to consider the conceptual development of Time through this period.
The task of analytic logic is thoroughly wedded to the critical practice of assessing the arguments of thinkers, analytical or otherwise. As such, analytic philosophers may express vexation at times in dealing with obscure writing, since this compounds the difficulties of assessing the merits or demerits of a grand philosophical work. What would be ideal (for the analytical critic) is for the author to express his or her whole philosophical system in terms that plied closely to the subject-predicate propositions described by Aristotle, or else, to make ample use of the declarative copula.
Hegel's writing is at least descriptive of the spirit of history, as is largely his intention, but the various foci of his writing include such things as concepts as such, ideas as such, notions as such, spirit as such, rights as such, freedom as such, and so on. These are, taken by themselves, resilient against analytical attempts to define and indicate as phenomena, since they are ultimately noumena, or in the German, dingen-an-sich. Their very natures as conceptual sources produces many of the difficulties of assessing them in terms of their ultimate or ideal meanings, and the ways we define them in our tendencies toward utilizing them for making ontological and moral arguments. That is, they do not easily lend themselves to criticism by way of theoretical assertions regarding what they are or are not, but only by means of a kind of historical test, which leads thinking to regard certain matters as intuitive and correct, regardless of whether history has in every case provided a people with the full manifestation of the thought. To make plainer what I mean, consider that not every natural human right has been secured and protected by every government in history. And yet, we do have a certain rational intuition which would lead us to suppose that a right remains a right regardless of its absence or presence in law. A right is a thing in itself, and not simply something seen or not seen, something whose existence or non-existence stands solely upon its realization within an historical framework.
This was one of Hegel's most important insights, that concepts belong to noumenological thinking, and that they were transcendental sources for moral thinking. But Hegel is not to be credited with inventing this idea (so much less would he have been able to argue it if he were!). Indeed, he received the idea at least in part from Immanuel Kant, who made clear how the the spirit of change resides in the spirit of self as Time. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that time is the internal, synthetical form of sensuous intuitions, This can be further clarified by noting what he regarded as the external form of sensuous intuition, Space. As such, Kant framed the mind-body dichotomy in a way that clarified Descartes' basic maxim, cogito; ergo, sum: I think; therefore, I am. This Internal form, of self-as-Time, provides us with much of the substance we find in Hegel's idea of the self as the spirit of change. Karl Marx inherits this same idea in his famous criticism of Feuerbach, wherein he argues that the goal of philosophy is not simply to describe the world, but to change it.
Such a vision, wherein the person can be a force for change, because their internal hermeneutical constitution is itself comprised of the ultimate force for change (Time), echoes an ancient idea that was perhaps first stated in the Bhagavad-Gītā, wherein Kṛṣṇa claims an identity with Time. It is perhaps no mere coincidence then, that Hegel was disposed to quote Kṛṣṇa in his own work on the spirit of history.
Progressivism, as the political identity of this spirit may be indicated always looks to the future as a source of novelty and improvement, even while keeping one eye toward a criticism of all that already exists. Here, one's ability to see the world temporally—as consisting of past, present, and future—also provides one the ability to anticipate what is yet to come (in harmony with the spirit of progress), while keeping at bay all attempts to turn it back through mere nostalgia for what must finally perish, and which may resent its own finitude for fear of death.
Descartes' Cogito gave birth to Modern philosophy, and amplified the insights of German Idealism. Both Kant and Hegel owe much to Descartes for giving them a starting point from which to imagine the world. The spirit of Time gave itself expression through the Transcendental philosophy of Kant, and through the Historiology of Hegel. Understanding the implications of Hegelian philosophy would seem thus to require us to consider the conceptual development of Time through this period.
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